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COPYRIGHT-ORIGINALITY-CONFUSING
THE STANDARDS FOR GRANTING
COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS*
Copyright protection for authors is provided as an encourage-
ment for creativity.' The Copyright Act,2 which provides that pro-
tection, derives its authority from the Constitution,3 so any consti-
tutional requirements must be met in application of copyright pro-
tection. Most scholars and commentators agree that the constitu-
tional sine qua non is originality.'
Because it is the criterion which determines whether intellec-
tual property is granted legal protection, originality is the founda-
tion on which any other copyright question ultimately rests. It is
of some moment, then, that departure from the standards which
customarily have been applied in assessing originality was recently
made in two cases within the Second Circuit.5 That departure is
likely to have an impact far beyond the cases involved. It may be
that, by confusing copyright tests with patent tests, the courts
have put themselves in a position to make value judgments about
what is to be granted protection. The question may no longer cen-
ter around what meets the bare constitutional test, but may focus
on individual judicial determinations of what is worthy of copy-
right protection.
* This article has been submitted to the Nathan Burkan Memorial competi-
tion.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). "The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts'." Id. at 219.
M. NiMmER, NIMMER ON COPYmoHT § 3.1 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as
NiMMER].
2 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-217 (1976).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
Dworkin, Originality in the Law of Copyright, 39 B.U.L. REv. 526 (1959), in
ASCAP, 11 COPYRIGHT LAw SymPosIuM 60 (1962); Whicher, Originality, Cartogra-
phy, and Copyright, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 280 (1963); Yankwich, Originality in the Law
of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457, 458 (1951); NmiMER § 3.2, 6.1.
Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249
(U.S. Oct. 5, 1976); Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 609
(D.R.I. 1976).
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STUDENT NOTES
Traditionally courts have dealt warily with the originality re-
quirement and have applied only minimal standards in trying to
find enough originality in a work to satisfy the constitutional basis
of statutory protection. Courts have not been willing to go further
than was necessary to meet the constitutional .test. This unwilling-
ness can be attributed to the court's awareness of the limited na-
ture of copyright protection, to a sense that the judiciary is not
properly trained to make aesthetic judgments, and to a concern
with inhibiting free expression.
The protection an author derives from a copyright grant is
quite limited in comparison with the protection provided by a
patent. Copyright law only protects an author from having anyone
else duplicate or directly copy his work; 7 patent law, on the other
hand, gives the holder absolute ownership of the patented domain. 8
The subject matter appropriate to each is different as well. Copy-
right protection is restricted to "expressions of ideas," not ideas
themselves, the latter being within the province of the patent.' Any
I Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945). "Obviously the
Constitution does not authorize such a monopoly grant to one whose product lacks
all creative originality. And we must, if possible, so construe the statute as to avoid
holding it unconstitutional." Id. at 513.
1 An author is not protected from someone who might have written or drawn
the same work from a similar creative impulse; he is only protected from the direct
reproduction of his creative impulse. "[I]t is plain beyond peradventure that an-
ticipation as such cannot invalidate a copyright. Borrowed the work must indeed
not be, for a plagiarist is not himself pro tanto an 'author'; but if by some magic a
man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn,
he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem,
though they might of course copy Keats's." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Ricker v. General Electric
Co., 162 F.2d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1947); Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp.,
82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936).
1 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879):
"A treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old or new;
on the construction and use of ploughs, or watches, or churns; or in the
mixture and application of colors for painting or dyeing; or on the mode
of drawing lines to produce the effect of perspective, would be subject to
copyright; but no one would contend that the copyright of the treatise
would give the exclusive right to the art or manufacture described
therein. The copyright of the book, if not pirated from other works, would
be valid without regard to the novelty, or want of novelty, of its subject-
matter. The novelty of the art or thing described or explained has nothing
to do with the validity of the copyright."
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld,
2
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standard of "newness" or "novelty" therefore, may not be consid-
ered in a copyright question since most ideas are not new but are
expressed over and over in accents peculiar to each age and genera-
tion.'0
Because of the differences in the kinds of subject matter pro-
tected and the amount of protection offered, there is understanda-
bly a distinction between the requirements of patent and copy-
right. To be granted letters-patent an inventor's work must be
shown to have novelty; that is, it must possess unique qualities
which have not been anticipated by any prior work. A copyrighta-
ble work, however, need show only the requisite originality in order
to obtain its more limited protection."
When application is made for a copyright, there is little if any
assessment of the originality of the work. Issuance of a copyright
itself serves little more than a registration function.'2 Only when
the validity of the copyright is challenged, usually in an infringe-
ment action, must the question of originality be addressed. The
question arises in the form of a judicial inquiry, and any standards
that must be determined in order to settle the question are, neces-
sarily, judicially created.
511 F.2d 904, 906 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 122 (1975); Chamberlin v. Uris
Sales, 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
,1 As Justice Story put it:
"In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few,
if any things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original
throughout .... If no book could be the subject of copy-right which was
not new and original in the elements of which it is composed, there could
be no ground for any copy-right in modern times, and we should be
obliged to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to find a work entitled to
such eminence."
Emerson v. Davies. 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845); Chamberlin
v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945); Whist Club v. Foster, 42 F.2d
782 (2d Cir. 1929).
" Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975); Stein
v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1953); aff'd., 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669
(1936).
12 Gordon v. Weir, 111 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1953), aff'd mem., 216 F.2d
508 (6th Cir. 1954). "The Copyright Office, by accepting [an author's] material
as copyrightable, does not thereby determine his rights under copyright laws any
more than a registrar of documents covering land titles, by accepting a deed for
recording, determines title of the grantee therein to the land." Id. at 123.
[Vol. 79
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It is here one sees that the reluctance of courts to make quali-
tative judgments stems in part from the feeling that the judiciary
is not trained to determine the value of originality. Justice Holmes
felt that "[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits."'' 3 Holmes reflected the court's concern with trying
to avoid any possibility of going beyond the bounds of objectivity
in establishing basic standards of originality.'4
The critical problem for courts, then, is to define originality
so as to avoid making aesthetic judgments. Courts have endea-
vored to protect origin:'5 a work is adjudged original in the sense
that it owes its origin to the author. They have also protected hard
work:'6 rewarding the labor and diligence of the creator of a work.
Originaity in either of these instances means little more than a
prohibition of actual copying; so if a work is not slavishly copied"
from another, it may find protection even if it duplicates another
work.
The ultimate hard work protection seems to arise in directory
and compilation cases. So long as the materials are compiled and
arranged from scratch and there has been no copying, the compiler
" Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
" Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758 (D. Mass. 1894). "But a multitude of
books rest safely under copyright, which show only ordinary skill and diligence in
their preparation .... [T]he courts have not undertaken to assume the functions
of critics, or to measure carefully the degree of originality, or literary skill or training
involved." Id. at 764.
,1 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). "In
order to be copyrightable, the work must be the original work of the copyright
claimant .... But the originality necessary to support a copyright merely calls
for independent creation, not novelty." Id. at 1109.
Withol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (No.
5728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839); Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 383 F. Supp.
650 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 505 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1974).
"1 Jewelers Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1921),
cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922). "The right to copyright a book upon which one
has expended labor in its preparation does not depend upon whether the materials
which he has collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or whether
such materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language,
or anything more than industrious collection." Id. at 88.
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (No. 4436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
11 Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 122 (1975).
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will be granted a copyright.'" Another area where hard work seems
to earn copyright protection is editing, so that when Hebrew schol-
ars correct books in the public domain by adding proper accents
and cantillation marks, their editorial work is original, therefore
copyrightable.'9 Where higher standards for originality than these
have been applied-as they have been in map cases-the courts
concerned have generally been considered to be inconsistent with
other copyright case law."0
The underlying reason that courts have been reluctant to in-
crease the originality standard is that they must constantly bal-
ance the protections afforded by the copyright clause with the
guarantees against limiting free expression which are inherent in
the first amendment, endeavoring to construe the former so as not
to infringe upon the latter.2 '
,1 Jewelers' Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1921),
cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922). "The man who goes through the streets of a town
and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and
their street number, acquires material of which he is the author. He produces by
his labor a meritorious composition, in which he may obtain a copyright, and thus
obtain the exclusive right of multiplying copies of his work." Id. at 88.
Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, 131 F.2d 809, 812-13 (7th Cir.
1942).
" Shulsinger v. Grossman, 119 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). But see Grove
Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967), where
the court held that forty thousand editorial changes in a public domain work did
not show skill and originality. The changes were virtually all concerned with punc-
tuation, spelling, and typographical errors.
2' [Flor some inexplicable reason, courts have lost sight of the pur-
pose of the law of copyright as it applies to maps and, at the expense not
only of sound reasoning but also of the careful application of precedent,
have imposed an inordinately high requirement or originality in this area
of intellectual endeavor.
Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76
HAv. L. REv. 1569, 1572 (1963); Whicher, Originality, Cartography, and Copyright,
38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 280 (1963).
21 The tension is created because the First Amendment assures that "no law"
shall abridge the freedom of speech (and does not limit that freedom to expressions
original with the speaker), while the copyright clause grants authors a monopoly
on their expressions or writings. If courts interpreted the constitutional standard
for copyright too loosely, virtually all expressions would come within the area pro-
tected by copyright. If, on the other hand, the constitutional standard were too
strictly interpreted, courts would find themselves imposing discriminatory value
judgments on works that otherwise warranted copyright protection. Either extreme
offends the First Amendment. A standard which affords copyright protection is
essential, however, because the public might be denied the benefit of creative
[Vol. 79
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Everything is not copyrightable, however. There are limits
beyond which no court has been willing to go. One such limit was
unquestionably reached in National Telegraph News Co. v. West-
ern Union Telegraph Co.,2" when Western Union merely collected
appropriate information regarding stock quotations, race results,
and other "listings," and distributed it through a ticker system.
The court refused to cross the line where "authorship ends and
mere annals begin." Nor has protection been extended to lan-
guage embodied in contractual provisions. 2 The courts generally
reason that any variation in contract language would necessarily
be trivial, and the drafter probably meant to rely on judicially
approved contractual language.
25
Copies of works in the public domain will support a copyright
if they can show variation from the original which is not trivial.
26
The judicial search for that variation usually revolves around one
of three possible concerns: (1) finding that a different medium is
involved, requiring, therefore, original skills or an unavoidable var-
iation;27 (2) finding a new, i.e. original, arrangement of public do-
main sources;2 8 (3) finding a distinguishable variation. As one
expressions of ideas if authors were not granted economic encouragement. Without
public benefit from creativity, the purpose of the copyright clause would be
thwarted. See Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees
of Free Speech ahd Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970); see also Lee v. Runge,
404 U.S. 887, 892 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
119 F. 294 (7th Cir. 1902).
Id. at 297.
24 Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938). "A copyright
upon a form of contractual provision should not be construed so as to impinge upon
the natural right of persons to make contracts containing the same contractual
provisions and creating like contractual rights and obligations ...... Id. at 874.
" Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Service, 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970).
26 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1976) ("translations or other versions"); Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d (2d Cir. 1951).
21 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). The
court held that translating paintings into mezzotints required sufficient skill and
judgment to meet the requirement of originality. Variation was virtually assured
because the copier had to work within the demands and quirks of a different me-
dium.
11 In Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (No. 5728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) the court
held that although the author, in compiling notes to accompany a Latin grammar,
did not use "new" material, he could copyright his "arrangement" from the multi-
plicity of public domain materials; and in Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley
Co., 313 F.2d 143 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963), the court found that
the new arrangement of public domain materials into a series of "flash cards" was
sufficient to support a copyright.
6
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court explained it, "[w]hile a copy of something in the public
domain will not, if it be merely a copy, support a copyright, a
distinguishable variation will, even though it present the same
theme. '29 One may, for example, copyright his improvised version
of a folksong heard in his childhood;" or sufficiently transform
information in tabloid articles which derives from other sources;3'
or make a scale model of a famous sculpture." The copy need have
only enough variation, or individuality, to warrant being inter-
preted as a version of another work.3
If the aim is to reproduce another work, there is one unyielding
caveat. "Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to
copy the copy." Reproductions, of course, cannot involve varia-
tion to the degree that original works will. So in assessing whether
a reproduction will support a copyright, courts are apt to downplay
the search for distinctions and concentrate their attentions on
looking for skill and original work on the part of the author."
It is against this background that the recent decisions from
within the Second Circuit must be viewed, and when they are so
viewed, they seem clearly to be at odds with the established judi-
cial patterns of expansion of protection.
In Batlin v. Snyder,3 for example, Snyder created a plastic
Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927).
Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956).
3' Best Medium Pub. Co. v. National Insider, Inc., 385 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1967).
" Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 171 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The
court found that skill and originality were required to produce an accurate scale
reproduction of Rodin's "Hand of God."
31 As Justice Holmes put it: "The copy is the personal reaction of an individual
upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singu-
larity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright ......
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
' Id. at 249.
Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951);
Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 415 F.2d
1007 (2d Cir. 1969); Peter Pan Fabrics Inc. v. Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 32 C.O.
Bull. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
394 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd on rehearing, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976), (hereinafter cited as
Batlin). There are three separate opinions which will be referred to in discussing
this case. The District Court opinion filed by Judge Metzner, granting injunction
[394 F. Supp. 1389]; the unpublished opinion written by Judge Meskill, reversing
[Vol. 79
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version of a cast-metal antique Uncle Sam bank which had long
been in the public domain. He hired a designer and sculptor to
make a reduced model of the original. Subsequently a mold was
made from the independently created model, and certain changes
were made in the design to accommodate the new medium (plas-
tic) in which the Snyder banks were to be made. Snyder's copy-
right was challenged by Batlin. Initially the United States District
Court held that there was insufficient originality to support copy-
right; then the Court of Appeals, by a divided panel, reversed that
decision; but the court, upon rehearing en banc, finally held the
copyright invalid for lack of substantial variation from the original
public domain bank.
Judge Metzner, who wrote the District Court opinion, and
Judge Oakes, who wrote the en banc court of appeals opinion, both
finding lack of substantial variation, ignored the distinction be-
tween patent tests and copyright tests. "A considerably higher
degree of skill is required, true artistic skill, to make the reproduc-
tion copyrightable," 7 according to Judge Oakes. And at the evi-
dentiary hearing below, the court interjected several questions or
comments which indicated its concern with the question of nov-
elty, the patent standard."
In a companion case, Etna Products Co. v. E. Mishan &
Sons,"2 which was heard in challenge of the same Snyder copyright,
Judge Metzner continued the confusion of copyright and patent
standards. He distinguished an earlier case" from Etna by finding
that the earlier author had relied on new concepts and original
ideas, therefore making that copyright valid. By contrast he re-
fused to uphold the copyright in Etna because there was no original
idea involved. "This idea is clearly in the public domain, and is
the same creative idea that exists in the antique banks."4
the lower court and holding that the copyright in question was valid [Civil No. 75-
428 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 13, 1975)]; Judge Oakes's opinion upon rehearing which sup-
ported the District Court's holding that the copyright was invalid [536 F.2d 486].
1, 536 F.2d at 491.
33 Reply Brief for Appellant at 10, Batlin v. Snyder, Civil No. 75-428 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
:' Civil No. 75-428 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 13, 1975) (hereinafter cited as Etna).
" Doran v. Sunset House Distribut. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961),
aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
1' Brief for Appellants at 21-23, Batlin v. Snyder Civil No. 75-428 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (Emphasis added). Expert testimony indicated that only a trained sculptor
8
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The court of appeals also ignored the original and independent
work done by Snyder. Snyder's expert witness testified that re-
producing the bank required an original drawing by a designer, a
carved model bya sculptor, and newly constructed dies. All of the
work was drawn from or based on the original public domain work.
In addition, the model was reduced in size from the original bank.
There were, as well, variations imposed by the choice of plastic as
a medium, and variations imposed by choice of medium are gener-
ally considered within the artistic ambit and qualify as indepen-
dent, artistic achievement.2
The test reflected in Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.43 is
the standard used to assess variation and requires more than a
merely trivial variation44 in the item or that the author supply
"something recognizably 'his own'."4 5 While the courts used pre-
cisely that language in Batlin, the test itself was not applied to the
facts before the court. The test regarding skill is given in Alva
Studios, Inc. v. Winninger;48 it requires that "work must be origi-
nal in the sense that the author has created it by his own skill,
labor and judgment without directly copying."4 While the court
in Batlin gave lip service to the test espoused in Alva, it did not
apply the test itself.
Further confusion follows a commingling by the Batlin court
of copyright and infringement tests and standards." The standards
which have traditionally been used to determine whether one work
infringed upon another have been necessarily higher than those
standards applied to questions concerning validity of copyright."
or artist would be able to make the kind of model required to reproduce an item in
changed dimensions.
42 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104-05 & n.22 (2d
Cir. 1951).
13 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
1 Id. at 103.
4 Id.
4' 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (hereinafter cited as Alva).
Id. at 267.
See Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of
Facts, 76 HAmv. L. REv. 1569, 1573 (1963).
4' Puddu v. Buonamici Statutory, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971):
"The tests for eligibility for copyright and avoidance of infringement are
not the same. Originality sufficient for copyright protection exists if the
'author' has introduced any element of novelty as contrasted with the
material previously known to him. Introduction of a similar element by
[Vol. 79
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In an infringement inquiry the courts use the ordinary observer
test-whether the ordinary observer comparing the works can
readily see that one has been copied from the other 0 The analysis
used to determine whether the test has been met generally involves
a balancing or parallel comparison of the details of each work. 51 If
enough similarily is found in those details, so that the overall im-
pression of both items is the same, then there is infringement.
Where an infringement analysis looks for substantial similarity,
however, a copyright analysis seeks a distinguishable variation. 5
While these distinctly different approaches have been used in
most of the copyright cases heard in the Second Circuit and else-
where, the Batlin court failed to make the distinction and pro-
ceeded with its inquiry using the terms of copyright but the analy-
sis of infringement. Numerous details of the plastic version were
directly compared to corresponding details of the iron bank: um-
brella, carpetbag shape, the object held by the eagle, shape of
Uncle Sam's face, texture of the clothing. 3 Despite "primary vari-
ations between the two banks involv[ing] height; medium; ana-
tomical proportions of the Uncle Sam figure,"54 the court looked
only to the substantial similarity of the banks. Under the normal
copyright criteria any one of these variations might well suffice to
grant Snyder copyright protection. After all, the only protection he
would receive is assurance that anyone else wishing to make a
version of the public domain bank would have to copy the original
and could not slavishly copy this particular version.
The second case of particular interest is Vogue Ring Creations,
Inc. v. Hardman.55 Vogue created and marketed a version of a
public domain finger ring design, for which it claimed the copy-
right. Hardman challenged the validity of that copyright on the
basis that there was insufficient originality in Vogue's version. The
the copier of a copyrighted design will not avoid liability for infringe-
ment."
Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 287 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1960).
1 Hebert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64, 65 (2d
Cir. 1974).
" E.g., Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
52 Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting MIlls, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092, 1093
(2d Cir.) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
536 F.2d at 489.
' Id. at 493 (dissenting opinion).
410 F. Supp. 609 (D.R.I. 1976) (hereinafter cited as Vogue).
10
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district court upheld Hardman's challenge, again using the ap-
proach used in Batlin. Vogue's brief posited differences between its
version and the public domain design in the setting, width, height,
shank, color, and bottom edge of the ring. 6 The court weighed each
of those differences, comparing the public domain design detail by
detail with Vogue's design and found that the overall impression
failed to reveal sufficient variations in the copy to warrant copy-
right protection. Judge Pettine discussed the matters of "suffi-
ciently distinguishable variation," "not merely trivial originality,"
and asserted his sensitivity to the minimal originality standards,
but he relied finally on Couleur International Ltd. v. Opulent
Fabrics" as fully controlling. That reliance is indicative of the
confusion in the Second Circuit because Couleur is solely an in-
fringement action and does not deal with copyright validity at
all. The test Judge Pettine took from Couleur is the standard in-
fringement test: "the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect
the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard
their aesthetic appeal as the same."58 Therefore the court decided
that while the variations were admittedly present they did not
sufficiently add to or detract from the public domain design-in
effect applying a standard of artistic judgment rather than one of
minimal originality. 9
The courts in both Batlin and Vogue ignored or mistook the
purpose of the minimal originality standards. The courts in both
instances looked for an artistic or aesthetic achievement sufficient
to deserve a copyright. The protections discussed earlier for origin
or independent creation of an author did not come into the formula
at all. The courts mostly adhered to the customary language of
minimal originality standards but did not use the corresponding
analysis. Since more was required to meet the standards than ever
had been before, the definition of what would support a copyright
necessarily changed even though the language remained the same.
One might wonder if there were some confusion regarding the scope
of copyright protection itself. There is no indication in either case
that the court recognized how little protection is involved when a
m Brief for Plaintiff at 4, 5, Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F.
Supp. 609 (D.R.I. 1976).
" 330 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (hereinafter cited as Coleur).
Id. at 154
'0 Discussion of Vogue cannot here take into account any response by the court
of appeals since no appeal was filed in this case.
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version of a public domain work receives a copyright." Nor did the
courts make the expected, and logical, response of upholding the
copyright of the first copier and of requiring the second copier to
go back to the public domain sources for his version."
The effect of the Batlin and Vogue decisions would not war-
rant inordinate concern were it not for the influence of the Second
Circuit in this field. Because a disproportionately large number of
copyright decisions come from the Second Circuit, these recent
cases are apt to have great weight as precedent.
The burden of determining and applying standards seems
destined to remain with the judiciary; not even the Revised
Copyright Act will help since it does nothing further to define
"originality" 6 -so there can be no question of the need for a clear
understanding of the different standards and when they should be
applied. Certainly in the court that has the greatest impact on
American copyright law, confusion of tests and requirements can
only proliferate more confusion.
Even more serious is the likelihood that the court will grad-
ually engraft onto cases dealing with original works of art the rea-
soning used in cases involving versions or reproductions of works
in the public domain. If the court obscures distinctions among the
standards discussed above, is it likely to perceive which situations
call for which standards? Many works, including Snyder's bank,
could qualify both as reproductions of works in the public domain
and as original works of art.
Once the confused standards have been shifted from versions
Batlin v. Snyder, Docket No. 75-7308, 6372-73 (2d Cir., Oct. 24, 1975).
"In Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), Judge
Learnd Hand stated:
"Any subsequent person is, of course, free to use all works in the public
domain as sources for his compositions. No later work, though original,
can take that from him. But there is no reason in justice of law why he
should not be compelled to resort to the earlier works themselves, or why
he should be free to use the composition of another, who himself has not
borrowed. If he claims the rights of the public, let him use them; he picks
the brains of the copyright owner as much, whether his original composi-
tion be old or new. The defendant's concern lest the public should be shut
off from the use of works in the public domain is therefore illusory; no
one suggests it. That domain is open to all who tread it; not to those who
invade the closes of others, however similar."
11 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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of public domain works to original works of art, there would be a
real possibility of having judicial standards of what constitutes art.
If the court can determine the relative values of works that other-
wise fall into copyright classification, there may well be infringe-
ment of first amendment rights of free speech. 3 At present, an
article need only fall into the proper category in order to be copy-
rightable. Once that automatic qualification is met, there can be
no further distinguishing tests. Additional standards, beyond those
required by the Constitution, would be discriminatory and, as
such, in violation of first amendment protection.64
Perhaps the most insidious danger arises from the nature of
the cases involved. Few originality cases are major and few present
matters of broad interest. The copyrightability of a costume jew-
elry design or a novelty item geared for the bicentennial trade is
unlikely to generate great concern, so the confusion of standards
is likely to go unchecked. It is the extent or the eventual effect of
that confusion which is disturbing. Will the courts, through a series
of minor but incremental decisions, establish judicial control over
artists?
Imposition of the judicial will on the copyright statute is no
more desirable now than it was when Justice Holmes descried the
dangers. 5 Justice Douglas echoed the same concerns: "What may
be trash to me may be prized by others. Moreover, by what right
under the Constitution do five of us . . .impose our set of values
on the literature of the day?" 6 The Second Circuit treads danger-
ously close to the constitutional edge these gentlemen give warning
of; and as long as the current state of confusion continues, the
warning becomes more cogent with each case that is decided.
Jo Walton Eaton
See note 21 supra.
Id.
See note 13 supra.
66 United States v. 12 200-ft Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 137 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting opinion).
Similar constitutional questions regarding judicially-imposed standards vis a
vis copyright protection are more familiarly raised in obscenity cases. Questionable
decisions or confused applications of obscenity standards can result in the with-
holding of copyright protection (i.e. censorship) of a work of art. For a discussion
of that aspect of the Copyright Act-first amendment tension, see Forkosch,
Obscenity, Copyright, and The Arts, 10 Naw ENG. L. REv. 1 (1974-75).
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